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The relatively small number of cases presented for judicial review in
Florida on the subject of landlord and tenant has not been increased
appreciably during the 1951 to 1953 period. Neither the statutory nor the
case law has undergone any substantial changes. However, notably unique
factual situations have been presented for interpretation and the perplexity
of the "security deposit" problem has increased.
LIQUIDATED DAMACES
Validity of liquidated damage provisions.-The decisions involving
provisions for liquidated damages are difficult to resolve. Courts agree as
to the general principles of law to be applied; however, the difficulty of
applying them to specific factual situations has resulted in the same
anomalous situation that exists in the field of negligence, i.e., decisions
which, though applying the same reasoning to non-distinguishable fact
situations, reach opposite results. This is the present state of the law
in Florida. The first case to approach this problem was Stenor v. Lester.'
The facts were as follows: the lessee of a leasehold for a term of five years,
at a rental of $11,200 per year, deposited $11,200 as security. The lease
provided that the lessor should retain the deposited security as liquidated
damages for a breach of any of the terms or covenants of the lease, or
apply it as a pro tanta amount for the lessor's actual damages from such
breach. The court held that where a sum is to be kept as liquidated
damages for the breach of any of several covenants of unequal import,
or where the lessor has the option of retaining such sum as liquidated
damages or applying it against actual damages, such provisions will be con-
strued as a penalty. Three cases2 followed, which presented closely
correlative fact situations, and were decided in accord with the Stenor case.
However, in North Beach Investments v. Scheikowitz, the court held
a similar provision to be valid as providing for liquidated damages. The
court distinguished this case from those preceding by holding that the
damages were unascertainable, whereas they were readily ascertainable in
the other cases. The court has apparently strayed from the real issue.
The intent of the parties is, nominally at least, the decisive factor in these
cases.4 While courts will not effectuate a mere verbal intent to provide
*Senior Student, University of Miami School of Law.
I. 58 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1952).
2. Kaplan v. Katz, 58 So.2d 853 (Fla. 1952); Nash v. Bailey, 58 So.2d 680
(Fla. 1952); Glynn v. Roberson, 58 So.2d 676 (Fla. 1952),
3. 63 So.2d 498 (Fla. 1953).
4. Sun Printing and Publishing Asso. v. Moore, 183 U.S. 642 (1902); Caesar v.
Rubinson, 174 N.Y. 492, 67 N.E. 58 (1903).
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for liquidated damages when it appears that the damages are readily capable
of ascertainment and the stipulated sum is out of proportion thereto, i.e.,
where a penalty would actually result," it does not follow that the mere
factor of unascertainable damages will be treated conversely in connection
with an intent to provide for a penalty. Having held that such provisions
clearly show an intent to provide a penalty, how can the court hold such
a provision valid as providing for liquidated damages?
In any event, the dicta of the court in these cases leads one to believe
that damages flowing from the breach of an ordinary lease will never be
considered unascertainable, within the meaning of that term necessary to
support a liquidated damages provision. 6
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
Acquisition of adverse title by tenant.-The Supreme Court in
overruling the chancellor's finding of fact, held that a landlord-tenant
relationship existed, and consequently a tax deed to the leasehold acquired
by the tenant without the landlord's knowledge was subject to a constructive
trust in favor of the landlord.7 Two justices dissented on the grounds
that a constructive trust may be proved by parol only where the evidence
is so clear and unequivocal as to remove any doubt that the chancellor
may have as to the existence of the trust.8 Since the formation of a
constructive trust was dependent upon the fact of the existence of the
landlord-tenant relationship, and the evidence on this point was conflicting,
it would appear that the dissent had a cogent argument for upholding
the chancellor's decree.
LEAsE PROVISIONS
Interpretation.-A lease specifying the term to be "for -and during
the war with the 'Axis Nations' and for 6 months after the final treaty
of peace" (italics supplied), was held terminated.'0  Many cases have been
presented for judicial review involving clauses specifying the term to be
"duration of the war" or "termination of the war." Though the courts
tend towards a strict interpretation of these terms when construing
statutes," the tendency in cases involving private contracts has been to
5. Gay Mfg. Co*v. Camp, 65 Fed. 794 (4th Cir. 1895); Goldstein v. Harjes, 219
App. Div. 275, 219 N.Y. Supp. 715 (1927); Electrical Products Corp. v. Ziegler Drug
Stores, 141 Or. 117, 15 P.2d 1078 (1932).
6. Cf. Bums 'frading Co. v. Welbom, 81 F.2d 691 (10th Cir. 1936).
7. Ballard v. Gilbert, 55 So.2d 723 (Fla. 1952).
8. Id. at 726.
9. See Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419 (1927) and cases cited therein
at p. 426.
10. Ehrlich v. Barbatsis Holding Co., 63 So.2d 911 (Fla. 1953).
11. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 261 U.S. 146 (1919).
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accord such terms their popular meaning, i.e., cessation of hostilities. 12
The theory upon which these latter decisions arc based is that these
terms have no definite legal meaning; therefore, they are to be interpreted
in accord with the probable intent of the parties.' 3 In the instant case,
the court holds, in effect, that the term "final treaty of peace" is of the
same nature as "duration of war," i.e., admits of no exact legal meaning.
The whole decision is based upon this contention. It is opined that the
result reached in this case is desirable, and actually the only feasible one.
However, it would have been better to have arrived at it on the equitable
theory of mutual mistake, rather than hold that the term "treaty of peace,"
especially with the adjective "final" pre-fixed, does not have a definite
legal meaning.
A covenant to "use and occupy for and during the term hereinafter
set forth" in connection with a covenant "not to use said premises for any
other than as a theatre and picture show" was held to mean no more
than the imposition of a restriction on the use of the property. 14 The
inference that the parties intended the more onerous burden of operating
the theatre during the life of the lease could not be reasonably drawn from
these covenants. There was no showing that the parties considered,
during negotiation of the lease, the effect the operation would have on
the premises and those adjoining, and while it was alleged that great
injury would result from a failure to so operate the premises, no proof
was offered to support the allegation. The court distinguished this case
from cases involving leases wherein the amount of rental specified is
materially dependent on the operation, and the obligation to operate a
business is therefore implied.' 5
There is a possibility that if, in a similar case, it be evidenced that
it was the intent of the parties to require the operation of the premises,
the court might construe such a covenant so as to reach an opposite
result. For in Congressional Amusement Corporation v. Weltman, 6 the
District of Columbia Court, in construing a similar covenant, reached the
same result as the Florida Supreme Court. It held that such a covenant was
either unambiguous to the contrary of such a contention (the obligation to
operate) or "at the very least, was so ambiguous that the lessees were
entitled to introduce parol evidence." However, in a later case17 the
12. Lalolla Casa de Nanana v. Hopkins, 98 Cal. App.2d 339, 219 P.2d 871 (1950);
Rupp Hotel Operating Co. v. Donn, 158 Fla. 541, 29 So.2d 441 (1946); Colonial Hotels
v. Maynard, 158 Fla. 318, 29 So.2d 28 (1946); Universal Oil Products Co. v. Shell
Development Co., 195 Misc. 497, 95 N.Y.S.2d 355 (1949), af'd, 296 App. Div. 1058,
96 N.Y.S.2d 486 (1950); Lincoln v. Harvey, 191 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1945).
13. Ibid.
14. Flosti Corp. v. Marlemes, 53 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1951).
15. Lincoln Tower Corp. v. Richter's Jewelry Co., 152 Fla. 542, 12 So.2d 452
(1943 ; Mayfair Operating Corp. v. Bessemer Properties, 150 Fla. 132, 7 So.2d 342(1942).
16. 55 A.2d 95 (D. C. 1947).
17. Amos v. Cummings, 67 A.2d 687 (D. C. 1949).
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same court held a similar covenant to be effective to create an affirmative
obligation to operate in the manner specified. It distinguished this case
from the previous one on the basis that there was a showing here that
it was the intent of the parties that such use be affirmatively required, and
that a failure to do so might result in serious loss to the landlord.
In another case 8 the controlling provisions of the lease in question
were as follows: the lessee was to use the premises for a women's apparel
store and no other purpose; the lessee could sublease, but such sub-tenant
could not conduct any business that would conflict with the business
of any other tenant in the building. The lessee had sublet the premises
and the sub-tenant was operating a gift shop therein. The landlord
argued that since the rent was contingent in part on the amount of
gross sales, the "use" was limited by implication. This reasoning was not
accepted. The court held that the lease was clear, certain and unambiguous
as relating to this point. The restriction to a single use applied only
to the original lessee, and the sub-lessee could use the premises for any
non-conflicting business, such as the gift shop in question.
EQUITABLE RELIEF
The Supreme Court upheld a chancellor's decree granting equitable
relief to a lessee-defendant who had failed to perform the condition
precedent to the exercise of his right to renewal of his lease. The lease
required transmittal to the lessor of written notice thirty days prior to
termination of the lease, but such notice was not given until twelve days
prior to termination. The chancellor found as a matter of fact that the
lessor had not been damaged by the delay, and that the equities were
with the lessee. One justice dissented on the grounds that the "hardship"
requisite to such relief was not evidenced in this case; that a mere showing
of "equities" in favor of the lessee would not be sufficient to justify granting
equitable relief.19 Though, of course, it is a question of fact that is argued
here, it should be noted that the granting of equitable relief in such
cases has always been predicated upon "unconscionablc loss" rather than
mere inconvenience or slight equities.20
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that a judgment of statutory
eviction does not bar an equitable action by the lessee for relief from
forfeiture.21  Also, it is elementary that courts of equity have inherent
power to relieve a lessee from forfeiture for non-payment of rent.2 The
reasoning proceeds upon the theory that the lease provision for termination
18. Ridgefield Investors v. Mae Ellen, 58 So.2d 676 (Fla. 1952).
19. Dugan v. Harge 54 So.2d 201 (Fla. 1951).
20. Shatford v. Gull Refining Co.. 65 F. Supp. 729 (W.D. La. 1946); F. B. Fountain
Co. v. Stein, 97 Conn. 619, 118 Atl. 47 (1922); Donovan Motor Car Co. v. Niles, 246
Mass. 106, 140 N.E. 304 (1923).
21. Rader v. Prather, 100 Fla. 591, 130 So. 15 (1930).
22. Sheets v. Selden, 74 U.S. 416 (1869).
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and re-entry upon failure to pay rent is designed to secure the payment
of rent, and if the landlord is made whole there is no purpose for the
forfeiture?3 Thus, the Florida Supreme Court granted relief to a lessee
who, when notified of his failure to pay the rent when due, tendered a
cheek which was wrongfully dishonored by the drawee bank; whereupon
the lessor brought a suit for statutory eviction.
2 4
Cases are few indeed where equity does not grant relief from forfeiture
under similar circumstances. The failure to pay must be of such nature
as to be termed wilful, such as habitual arrears or unreasonable time
overdue?
5
An interesting case2 1 raised the issue of whether a land owner could
erect and maintain a sign on his premises which obstructed the view
from the highway of the adjoining possessor's premises (restaurant) and
advertising sign. It had been alleged that the complainant was the
defendant's tenant, that the sign was constructed solely for spite, and
that it was causing serious loss to the complainant's business. The
chancellor found that substantial damage had been caused, but that it
would be inequitable to require the sign to be moved or destroyed. Relief
in the form of an abatement of rent was ordered for so long as the
sign was maintained in its location. The basis for the chancellor's opinion
does not appear in the report, but the only supportable one would
appear to be reasoning in accordance with the "spite fence doctrine."
In affirming the case, the court held that "the eviction and maintenance
of a large advertising sign is not per se a nuisance, but under certain
circumstances it may become one, and could well be one when it
seriously affects the rights and business of the adjoining property owner,
it having been erected for that purpose." The court stated further, "An
adjoining property owner cannot maintain a condition that may be or
become a nuisance on his property which is injurious to the business or
property rights of an adjacent landowner . . . . especially if that
adjoining property owner be his landlord," (italics supplied). The meaning
of this statement is obscure. The mere fact of a landlord-tenant relationship
would ordinarily render that to be a nuisance which was not otherwise so;
because if the relationship embodied covenants which that complained of
breached, it would be actionable as a breach thereof, and not thereby
rendered a nuisance.
EMINENT DOMAIN
Apportionment of award.-In a suit for a declaratory decree 7 the
Circuit Court of Dade County was confronted with the problem of
23. Paducah Home Oil Co. v. Paxton, 222 Ky. 778, 2 S.W.2d 650 (1928).
24. Nevins Drug Co. v. Bunch, 63 So.2d 329 (Fla. 1953).
25. Darvirris v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 235 Mass. 76, 126 N.E. 382
(1920).
26. McClosky v. Martin, 56 So.2d 916 (Fla. 1952).
27. Raleigh Operating Co. v. Naglo, 3 Fla. Supp. IIl (Cir. Ct. Dade County 1953).
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apportioning, between lessor and lessee, an award given for realty constituting
a part of the leased premises, which was taken by the city under right of
eminent domain. The court reasoned that since the tenant would have
had a right to use the land during the life of the lease, he should have a
right to the use of the money which stands in place of the land. Accordingly,
it was ordered that the full amount be given to the lessor and the lessor
credit the lessee with the yield such award would bring if invested in highest
grade securities (temporarily set at three and one-half per cent per annum).
This case is the subject of a note2 S wherein the many rules which
the various courts apply in determining the apportionment of such awards
are set forth. The rule announced in this case is very much like the
remedy provided in Massachusetts by statute.
29
28. Note, 8 MIAMI L.Q. 137 (1953).
29. MASS. GEr. LAws c. 79 § 24 (1921).
